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Abstract 
 
The Asian region has become a focus of attention for investors in recent years.  Due to the 
strong economic performance of the region, the higher expected returns in the area 
compared with Europe and the USA and the additional diversification benefits investment in 
the region would offer.  Nonetheless many investors have doubts about the prudence of 
investing in such areas.  In particular it may be felt that the expected returns offered in the 
countries of the Asian region are not sufficient to compensate investors for the increased 
risks of investing in such markets.  These risks can be categorised into under four headings: 
investment risk, currency risk, political risk, and institutional risk.  This paper analyses each 
of these risks in turn to see if they are sufficiently large to deter real estate investment in the 
region in general or in a particular country. 
 
Key words :  Asian real estate markets, investment, currency, political, and 
institutional risks. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Capital markets are becoming global markets and commercial real estate markets are no 
exception.  Recently, international real estate investors have expressed interest in investing in 
the Asian emerging markets.  Three main reasons can be given for investing in such markets.  
First the strong economic performance in the region, at least up to 1997 and the huge 
growth potential of the region in the future.  For example over the period 1966-1991 the 
average annual real economic growth rate for Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Malaysia 
was greater than 6% while the comparable figures for the US and UK were between 2% 
and 3% (Greenwood, 1993).  The second reason for investing in such countries is the very 
high returns such economic generates.  Indeed in a survey of investors in the UK and Asia 
“higher returns” and the potential for “capital appreciation” were ranked one and two as the 
main reasons to hold foreign property, Lim (2000).  A final reason apart from sharing in 
such economic growth and higher expected returns is the additional diversification benefits 
that may accrue.  Studies have shown the considerable benefits to be gained from the 
international diversification in real estate markets (see Lizerli et al 1998 for a review).  
However, the economic convergence observed in world markets and the globalisation of the 
worlds financial system has led to the emergence of a number of key financial centres: 
London, New York and Tokyo, whose real estate markets are closely tied to the new 
international financial circuits.  As a result their real estate markets are more integrated and 
so offer low diversification benefits, Lizieri (1992).  Thus the benefits for portfolio risk 
reduction are likely to be even greater from diversify into emerging markets, Divecha et al 
(1992).  Consequently countries in the Southeast Asian region including: China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand have come to 
be seen as areas of future investment because of their huge growth potential, greater returns 
and portfolio diversification benefits. 
 
Despite all of this most institutional investors still display a reluctance to go overseas in 
general and into emerging markets in particular, Solnik (1974).  One explanation for such a 
reticence is the possibility that investors impute “extra” risk to foreign investments, French 
and Poterba (1991).  In other words international investment may also increase an investor’s 
exposure to other pervasive economic factors, and therefore increase the investor’s level of 
risk.  These risks include an increased exchange rate risk, greater exposure to political risk, 
and greater tax uncertainty, thus increasing the risk of overseas investors relative to domestic 
investors.  Consequently the lack of investment in the emerging markets of the Asian region 
may simply be a perception that the returns achieved in such markets is not sufficient given 
the risks.  The emerging real estate markets of the Asian region therefore need to be 
evaluate to see whether the assumption that the expected returns in the emerging markets of 
the Asian region are not adequate to cover the increased risks borne by the foreign investor. 
 
In analysing overseas investment in general and emerging markets in particular two broad 
areas of enquiry have developed.  The first area of interest relates is their inherent volatility 
and the second the informational efficiency of the markets.  For example emerging markets 
can be characterised by their skewed wealth distributions, small size and concentrated 
market structures all of which it can be argued accentuates return volatility, Divecha et al 
(1992).  Thus it may be felt that there is a greater investment risk from emerging markets 
than from investment in developed countries.  In addition the greater political instability and 
higher levels of inflation in such markets is likely to lead to greater fluctuations in exchange 
rates making these locally volatile returns even more volatile when converted to the foreign 
investors home currency.  On the question of informational efficiency emerging markets by 
their nature have more recent origins than developed markets in addition to which they have 
adopted differing policies relating to the financial and real estate sectors than developed 
countries.  Hence it can be argued that emerging markets differ from their counterparts in the 
developed world in terms of their institutional structures and informational related attributes.  
Which can be characterised in terms of tax treatment of locals versus foreign investors, 
regulations of market entry and exit and factors relating to the quality and quantity of 
information dissemination.  In particular any differential in the tax treatment of local and 
foreign investors and any impediments that are placed on foreign investors from entering the 
market and/or hinders repatriation of income and capital inhibits participation by foreign 
investors so limiting market liquidity and increasing volatility.  Finally the free flow of 
information to all investors is a necessary condition for market pricing efficiency, without 
which mispricing can take place.  The newness of emerging markets and the different 
institutional structures adopted, compared with developed countries, suggests that access to 
all relevant information by all investors, especially foreign investors, is unlikely to be the 
case.  All of which suggests that unless an outsider is fully aware of the institutional structures 
of the market, both formal and informal, they are likely to be at a major disadvantage 
compared with local market players, Guerts and Jaffe (1996).  This institutional risk 
depends on the maturity and transparency of the market (Gordon, 1999 and Keogh and 
D'Arcy, 1994).  Thus if investors can become more informed of the institutional structures 
and business practices of overseas markets they are more likely to invest in those markets, 
i.e. “familiarity breeds investment”, Stratman (1999). 
 
Consequently from the discussion above the risks facing a foreign real estate investor can be 
broken down into four categories: investment risk (the volatility of returns), currency risk 
(exchange rate volatility), political risk (explicit barriers to capital flows, taxes, 
expropriation, and exchange controls) and institutional risk (market maturity, size and 
liquidity, regulation, and information).  Each of these is analysed in turn to see if they are 
sufficiently large to deter investment into the emerging markets of the Asian region. 
 
 
Investment Risk 
 
In the equity and bond markets there is abundant literature on the benefits of international 
diversification.  Madura (1985) provides an excellent review of the work as of 1985, while 
Lonie et al. (1993) extends the coverage to 1993.  All studies concluding that the risk and 
return advantages of international diversification are very large for investors in all the major 
countries.  Indeed with more assets to choose from a more widely diversified international 
portfolio cannot do worse than a one based on domestic stocks only.  In contrast the issue 
of international real estate diversification has received scant attention in the academic 
literature (Eichholtz et al, 1996).  In general data limitations have resulted in less research 
being undertaken.  
 
As it is felt that investment in merging markets is more risky than investment in developed 
markets it could be argued that this alone will deter investors.  Indeed Lim (2000) finds that 
UK investors are much more risk averse than their Asian counterparts.  Consequently the 
greater perceived risk of investing in the countries of Southeast Asia would seem to be the 
main reason for avoiding the area.  This perception can be questioned on at least two 
counts. 
 
First, modern portfolio theory (MPT) tells us that investors should focus on the expected 
return and risk of their portfolio as a whole rather than on the return and risk of each asset in 
isolation.  In other words individual risks are not of consequence because they can be 
diversified away at the portfolio level.  Indeed although the issue of international real estate 
diversification has received limited attention in the academic literature (Eichholtz et. al, 1996) 
even though the globalisation of financial markets has a particular significance for 
international property investment.  The few studies that have examined clearly show that the 
risk and return advantages of international diversification are very large for investors (see 
Lizieri et al, 1998 and D’Arcy and Lee, 1997). The research undertaken in securitised 
property markets has generally tended to support the benefits of risk reduction through an 
international real estate portfolio (Giliberto, 1990, Asabere et al, 1991, Eichholtz and Lie, 
1995 and Case, et al, 1997).  These results are confirmed when using data from the direct 
property market (Del Casino, 1986, Sweeney, 1989, Gordon, 1991, Wurtzebach, 1991 
and D’Arcy and Lee 1998).  Furthermore, the one study that that has examined the benefits 
of including the emerging markets in a global portfolio, albeit with securitised property data, 
finds that including at least some investment in emerging markets would have reduced the 
risks associated with developed country portfolios.  While Eichholtz et al (1996) finds that 
the existence of continental factors in determining property market returns means that 
emerging markets are a source of diversification benefit to both American and European 
investors.  Secondly, the tendency to lump emerging markets as a homogeneous group is a 
mistake.  The work by Eichholtz and Lie (1995) Eichholtz et al (1998a) on securitised 
property shows that additional diversification benefits accrue to investors within the region.  
Indeed the following data on the direct property market confirms this view. 
 
In order to investigate the risk/return performance from investing in the Asia-Pacific region in 
comparison with markets in the US and Europe the annual total returns from investing in the 
Office market of the capital (main) cities of the UK, USA, Europe and Asia-Pacific region 
over the period 1985-1997 were extracted from the ONCOR database.  The appreciation 
figures, however, are not based on appraisals, but upon changes in capitalised asking rents.  
The use of asking rents may make it difficult to identify sharp declines in commercial real 
estate markets, since effective rents typically lead asking rents in declining markets.  The 
rental figures used are net of service charges and local taxes. In calculating returns no 
adjustment was made for exchange rates between countries. The rational for not expressing 
returns in a common currency is to segregate the local market risk from currency risk for a 
number of reasons.  First it is well known that these two risks are not additive and that 
expressing the various local market portfolio returns in a common currency will have an 
adverse impact on their conditional mean and volatility measures.  Second the correlation 
coefficient between a set of local market portfolios is typically smaller when a currency 
factor is added in their returns.  Studies, therefore, which use common currencies, have 
great difficulty in dissociating these two risks.  Thus caution is needed to interpret the results 
of such an analysis, if based in a common currency, as the result of such studies can be 
misleading, Engle and Susmel (1993).  Therefore the case for investment in the Asia-Pacific 
region needs to be examined in isolation from exchange rate movements.  
 
Table 1: The Risks and Returns of Investing in the UK, USA,  
Europe and Asian Emerging Markets 1985-1997 
 
Source: ONCOR 
 
Table 1 shows that an institutional investor in the UK and especially the ones in the USA 
would have achieved much higher returns from investing in the emerging markets of Europe 
and Asia-Pacific.  Indeed surveys show that increased expected returns is the main 
motivation for investment in Southeast Asia, Lim (2000).  Naturally such an increased return 
would also be accompanied by increased risk (standard deviation) on an individual country 
basis.  However, Table 1 also shows that the correlation between the UK and the US with 
the emerging markets of Asia was on average much lower than that with Europe.  In 
addition the average intra-regional correlation within Europe was 0.236, and that within Asia 
0.169.  In other words the Asia-Pacific region not only offers greater returns to UK and US 
investors but shows greater intra-regional diversification benefits than Europe. 
 
This evidence on the benefits of international investment into emerging markets once more 
lends support to the arguments in favour of international diversification: lower portfolio risk 
arising from low correlation across countries and higher returns arising from faster-growing 
economies.  However even this strong case for international diversification into emerging 
 Averag
e 
SD Correlation 
 % % UK USA 
UK 10.52 22.99  1.000  0.076 
USA 2.18 8.19  0.076  1.000 
European Core     
Belgium 13.12 14.45  0.368  0.190 
Denmark 4.14 14.68  0.121 -0.502 
France 9.42 18.68  0.431  0.329 
Germany 8.37 13.87  0.147 -0.343 
Holland 9.43 10.84  0.286  0.062 
Asia-Pacific     
Australia 15.34 23.26  0.754  0.079 
Hong Kong 38.26 34.35  0.383 -0.380 
Malaysia 22.99 53.14 -0.364 -0.294 
Singapore 26.06 45.29 -0.134 -0.066 
Taiwan 40.06 54.78  0.138  0.001 
Average     
European Core 8.89 14.51  0.271 -0.053 
Asia-Pacific Average 28.54 42.17  0.156 -0.132 
markets seems to be insufficient to convince investors to invest in these markets.  Thus the 
lack of investment must be the related to the addition risks investors perceive as important 
when investing overseas. 
 
Currency Risk 
 
Investment overseas is a “two edged sword”.  In that while investors may reap the benefits 
of increased returns at lower portfolio risk when they venture overseas, such investors 
suddenly find themselves exposed to a relatively new type of risk, currency risk.  
Consequently Madura (1992) indicates that because overseas investors are more affected 
by exchange rate variations relative to domestic investors, they may have riskier returns.  
While Eun and Resnick (1988) note, fluctuating exchange rates may mitigate the gains from 
diversification.  Thus what is the impact of currency exposure on investment returns? 
 
What is Currency Risk? 
 
As explained in Eun and Resnick (1988) the domestic market return Rid, from an unhedged 
investment in the ith foreign market is given by  
 
)e1)(R1()R1( iiid ++=+    (1) 
 
Which can be written as: 
 
iiiiid eReRR ++=     (2) 
 
Where Ri is the return of property in the local foreign currency and ei is the rate of 
appreciation (depreciation) of the local currency against the domestic investors currency.  
The last term of this equation will generally be smaller than the first two, since it equals their 
product, and both are generally less than one.  Thus equation (2) can be restated as an 
approximation: 
 
iiid eRR +=      (3) 
 
It can now be seen that the return on a foreign investment (Rid) can be decomposed into two 
parts representing the local market return of the investment (Ri) in the ith country and the 
return on the foreign exchange rate (ei).  Thus if ei is negative and greater than Ri the home 
base return will be negative!  In contrast if ei is positive and greater than the local foreign-
based asset returns, which could be negative, the investors home based returns can be 
positive!   In other words the rate of return faced by an investor from a foreign-based 
investment can be significantly increased (decreased) by the appreciation (depreciation) of 
the foreign countries exchange rate compared with the investors domestic currency. 
 
By the same reasoning the risk (standard deviation) of the foreign currency based investment 
returns is given by: 
 
e,iei
2
e
2
iid 2 rss+s+s=s     (4) 
 
where: si is the individual risk of the property investment in the ith country, se is standard 
deviation of the ith countries exchange rate relation to the investors home base currency and 
rie is the correlation of the ith countries property returns with the exchange rate.  Thus 
equation (4) reveals that the smaller the correlation between the returns on a foreign 
currency and the returns on a foreign investment, the smaller will be the foreign investment 
risk.  Indeed if rie is negative an investor who ventures overseas could be holding an 
investment in a ‘risky’ foreign country that displays little or no risk when converted back into 
his home base currency.  Consequently the impact of currency risk can be easily 
exaggerated.  Indeed currency returns can offer enhanced foreign market returns as equally 
eliminate them.  In other words exchange rate adjusted returns are equally likely to be 
increased as well as reduced by the impact of exchange rate changes.  While the increased 
risk faced by investors in foreign country assets need be only marginally greater than that of 
the local country returns, so long as the correlation between the local foreign market returns 
and the exchange rate is low or even negative.  Furthermore investors have at their disposal 
a number of money market instruments with which they can hedge currency fluctuations.  
However, given the long term holding periods of real estate investment and the cost of 
hedging using traditional methods the difficulties of applying hedging techniques are 
problematical, see Worzala (1995), Worzala, et al (1997), Worzala and Newell (1997) and 
Lizieri, et al (1998) for reviews. 
 
Should Investors Hedge Currency Risk? 
 
Gastineau (1995) argues that given the success of currency derivative funds and overlay 
managers there are apparently possibilities to add value through active currency 
management.  According currency management could be a source of portfolio risk reduction 
and/or return enhancement.  Indeed Perold and Shulman (1988) show that based on 
theoretical assumptions, hedging currencies can generate non-zero returns, especially in the 
short run.  The authors then show that not only does investing internationally leads to risk 
reduction; fully hedging currency exposure leads to additional risk reduction while 
maintaining the return profile.  In other words investors are faced with a “free lunch” from 
hedging currency risk.  From their perspective, this is the main attractiveness for hedging 
currency exposure. 
 
In contrast Froot (1993) argues that long-term exposure to currency movements, for 
example by employing forward rate agreements, generate zero returns.  Using 200 years of 
data Froot finds that in the short run, following the work done by Perold and Shulman, 
hedging (fully) reduces volatility.  However, if the holding period of an Equities portfolio 
exceeds five years, a fully hedged portfolio exhibits a larger volatility than an unhedged 
portfolio.  In the case of a Bond portfolio the crossover point is on average eight years.  In 
other words (partially) hedging currency exposure is a waste of transaction, management, 
administrative and opportunity costs.  Given that investors often see Real Estate investment 
as a hybrid Equity/Bond security this would suggest that the cross over point of property 
investment is about six years.  In other words if investors holding period is about six years 
currency hedging is not only of little use but actually detrimental.  Froot attributes this result 
to the tendency that exchange rates exhibit mean reversion characteristics due to the 
equilibrating force of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).  Thus if exchange rates mean revert 
they can have no added value to the risk profiles of the portfolios of long term investors.  
However, in a floating exchange rate regime, where PPP does not hold perfectly, an 
overseas investor faces exchange rate risk (Solnik, 1974).  Nonetheless Froot concludes 
that in the long run exchange rates are more or less stable.  Consequently the minimum-
variance hedge (using derivatives) cannot reduce volatility below that of an unhedged 
portfolio over long run investment horizons.  Furthermore Gardner and Stone (1995) and 
Jorian (1985) both argue that the input estimates used to come to an optimal hedge ratio 
strategy will result in substantial estimation errors.  Thus if investors have a low to moderate 
risk tolerance, the use of the hedge ratio probably won't have any meaningful added value. 
 
In contrast Filatov and Rappoport (1992) in a study on international bond investing covering 
the period 1980-1989 have shown that a fully hedged position on the part of British, 
Japanese and German investors would have lead to additional risk in the portfolio.  
However, the period involved, the base currency and the fact that these premiums are non-
stationary can explain these results.  Indeed within the real estate market the work of 
Ziobrowski and Ziobrowski (1993), Addae-Dapaah and Choo (1996) and Worzala 
(1995), all find that although currency derivatives provided a limit to the magnitude of 
downside losses over relatively short periods (one year), their effectiveness was lost over 
the typically longer holding periods of real estate investment.  Moreover the periodic costs 
of hedging easy offset the gains.  Thus when short-term volatility is not an issue for an 
investor, they should not hedge currencies as this will only result in increased costs and 
therefore reduce the return potential of an investment portfolio. 
 
Nonetheless Perold and Shulman (1988) argue that the performance of international 
investors should be measured in local currencies (fully hedged) and every decision to have a 
different exposure than the base currency is an active investment decision.  In other words 
currency decisions can affect performance and so should be accounted for in assessing the 
success of fund managers investment decisions.  Indeed this argument is adopted in 
performance presentation standards by AIMR, the US financial analyst organisation.  Thus if 
fund managers deviate from the standard they have to inform investors as to the benchmarks 
they are using.  This implies investors are aware of the importance of currency risk can have 
on the overall risk of a portfolio and so it needs to be accounted for in evaluating the fund’s 
overall performance.  However, the perceived importance of currency risk to institutional 
real estate investors is not uniform.  For example, Worzala (1994) reports that only 44% of 
the UK, Dutch and German institutions sampled perceived currency fluctuations as an 
important variable in the international investment decision.  Although this may be due to the 
preference of European investors to concentrate their overseas investments in the other 
countries of Europe or the developed markets such as the US and Australia, where currency 
risk may be felt to be of only a minor impact.  Similarly McAllister (1999) finds that British 
institutions rank currency risk fourth in a possible list of eight potential problems associated 
with overseas investment.  In contrast similar surveys based on Asian investors found that 
the respondents are much more concerned with exchange rate risk than investors in Europe, 
Worzala and Newell (1997) and Lim (2000).  In other words although currency fluctuations 
are not perceived as the primary concern of investors when considering international 
diversification (except by Asian investors), it appears to play a minor role. 
 
Even in the Asian market the actual impact of currency risk is apparently small and 
insignificant.  Addae-Dapaah, and Yong (1998) in a study of currency risk on office 
investment within the Asian region find that for a single country investment. exchange rate 
risk can be substantial.  Nonetheless the impact was statistically insignificant, consistent with 
the findings of Ratcliffe (1994), Ziobrowski and Curico (1991) and Worzala (1995).  In 
other words when the impact of currency risk is considered in a portfolio context the authors 
found that the potential diversification benefits from international investment outweigh the 
supposed ravages of currency risk.  Thus an investor with a fully diversified portfolio should 
not be overly concerned with currency risk.  Supporting the conclusions of Solnik (1996) 
that exchange rate risks have never been a major component in a diversified portfolio over a 
long period of time.  Indeed Sweeney (1989) considers the additional risk of exchange rates 
to real estate investment to be minimal.  Whist Solnik and Odier (1993) and Drummen and 
Zimmermann (1992) find that the currency risks are only a minor determinant of European 
stock return variances.  Thus a review of the academic work on the question as to whether 
investors should hedge or not their currency exposure shows that a simple solution is not 
obvious. 
 
Should Currency Risk Play a Role in the Investment Decision? 
 
However, is currency risk management the function of the real estate fund manager?  In 
other words is the allocation decision to invest in certain countries an integrated or a 
separated process incorporating both the asset and currency implications of international 
investment?  The answer to this question highlights a difference between practice and 
academia.  To the academic international investment is usually viewed as an integrated 
process.  Where the decision as to what assets to hold is entwined with the currency 
implications of such decisions.  In contrast practitioners look upon country allocation and the 
embedded exposure to currency movements from a separated perspective.  For example, 
many multinational firms use a currency overlay approach when considering their investment 
overseas, Meijer (1996).  In other words foreign currency exposure is treated as a separate 
asset from the actual invest and is managed by a separate specialist team (Giddy, 1994). 
 
In summary, movements in foreign exchange rates occur so as to achieve equilibrium 
position between countries in terms of inflation and interest rate differentials, and as a results 
create a neutral effect on investment in the long run.  Unfortunately it seems that currencies 
can have a substantial impact on real estate investment returns, in the short and medium 
term, making the management of exchange rate during these periods vital to the immediate 
future heath of the investor.  However, currency risks can be overstated, for a number of 
reasons.  First, for long term investors there is a zero correlation between real estate returns 
and exchange rates in nominal terms means that foreign investors are not necessarily at 
greater risk than domestic investors.  Secondly, long tem investors are more concerned with 
the real rather than nominal returns from their investments.  The resulting inflation adjustment 
will reduce the impact of exchange risk, given the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
relationship.  In other words PPP neutralises exchange risk for long-term investors.  Thirdly, 
currency risk can be hedged through a number of money market instruments.  Fourth, real 
estate typically represents a minor proportion of the mixed-asset portfolio to long term 
investors, insurance companies and pension funds, the impact of exchange rate risk on the 
real estate portfolio as little or no impact at the mixed-asset level.  Finally there is the 
question as to whether or not currencies should be regarded as a separate function from the 
asset investment decision.  That is the should the decision to invest in a particular real estate 
market be made on the basis of local market conditions rather than the currency position of 
the fund.  In the main fund mangers see the allocation and the currency consequences as two 
separate decisions; see D'Arcy and Lee (1998). In other words real estate manager’s focus 
on returns in local currencies to make country allocation decisions and then let a currency 
manager decide whether the investment should be hedged, what proportion to hedge and 
how to hedge the currency risk.  Consequently the impact of currency risk on investment 
decision to purchase in Asia’s emerging real estate markets should not be a deterrent to 
long-term investors.  Nonetheless the presence of currency fluctuations adds an additional 
dimension of uncertainty to the investment decision, which many investors may prefer to 
avoid. 
 
Political Risk 
 
Political risk is often defined as the risk of adverse consequences arising from unexpected 
political events (e.g., Root, 1972 and Kobrin, 1979).  This definition is useful because it is 
the unexpected nature of the event that increases uncertainty and so investment risk.  
Consequently events that are either expected or easy to anticipate do not constitute political 
risk.  In addition it is the adverse consequences of political risk that detract from investment 
returns, and hence most concern investors.  Consequently political risk arises when a 
sovereign host government unexpectedly change the “rules of the game” under which 
businesses operate through intervention in the economy.  Such intervention may take many 
forms, including explicit barriers to capital flows, taxes, exchange controls and outright 
expropriation.  In addition such interventions are precipitated by exogenous shocks to the 
economy, such as changes in world demand and trade, and endogenous behaviour in 
response to internal forces, such as coupe or changes in the ruling party.  This has a 
profound affect on the risk of international investment, as instability in a host country's 
government, or monetary and fiscal policies results in more uncertain investment returns, 
Brewer (1993).  For example, host governments frequently impose penalties on overseas 
investors when market conditions deteriorate and so have an adverse effect on investment 
returns.  Penalties typically come in the form of restrictions on the repatriation of dividends 
and the control of the remittance of funds.  Also once the penalties have been imposed on 
foreign-investors in response to market turmoil they are unlikely to be relaxed until local 
market conditions improve.  Thus as it may be felt that political risks are greater in emerging 
than developed markets such risks may exert a significant influence on returns.  Indeed 
Diamonte et al (1996) among others find that changes in political risk represent an 
economically and statistically determinant of returns in emerging markets.  Thus Errunza 
(1983) notes that political risk, particularly in developing markets, could have a great deal of 
influence on the international portfolio investment decision.  Indeed in a survey of Asian and 
UK property investors “internal political stability” ranked second highest in factors 
influencing decision-making, Lim (2000). 
 
However, the political sources of risk can also decrease the risk to investing.  As 
exemplified recently in the cases of Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, where previously 
closed markets have had to agree to reforms within their markets and relaxation of 
restrictions and taxes applied to foreign investors as part of the conditions attached the loans 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Loans needed by such countries to help them 
weather their currency, real estate and stock market crises.  Thus the political consequences 
of the crises have lead in the case of Korea to the removal of all restrictions on foreign 
acquisition of land and property.  Promoting the government to establish the Korean Real 
Estate Information Service (KREIS), to provide property market information thus increasing 
the transparency of the market.  While the Korean Asset Management Company has 
acquired non-performing loans and packaging them to foreign and local investors alike.  
Thus creating a level playing field for local and foreign real estate investors, Gordon (1999). 
 
Furthermore although political risk is typically associated with the developing world, all 
international investments, whether in developed or developing countries, face some political 
risk.  Examples in developed countries include the imposition of tax on conversion of British 
shares to ADRs and exchange controls in France.  Also the increased political instability, 
normally associated with less developed countries, need not translate into political risk.  
Indeed, although the consequences of instability are usually adverse, such risks also can 
provide a number of profitable opportunities. 
 
In addition if political risk is diversifiable, then it will not affect investors’ required returns 
even though it may affect expected returns.  In contrast, if many or all investors share 
political risk, then required returns will reflect these systematic, non-diversifiable risks, and 
political risk will be compensated for in high returns.  The question becomes one then of 
whether political risk is priced in the domestic market and so impounded in the returns 
expected by foreign investors and/or whether political risk can be diversified in an 
international portfolio.  To see if this is the case we focus on two forms of political risk; 
expropriation the most severe form and exchange controls the most frequently encountered. 
 
The most severe form of adverse political risk is expropriation, the forced divestment of 
equity ownership of a foreign direct investor.  Further although as suggested above political 
risk is not restricted to developing countries, the incidence of expropriation since the Second 
World War has been largely a less developed country phenomenon.  Hence it deserves 
special consideration when considering investment in emerging markets.  In particular since 
expropriation risk weighs on only the foreign investor, then, regardless of the structure of 
world capital markets, local real estate would not appropriately reflect such risk.  
Furthermore although such expropriation is triggered by domestic considerations, it could be 
argued that such risks could be largely diversified away in a well-diversified portfolio.  
However, most real estate portfolios are unlikely to be well diversified internationally.  
Consequently such a risk is unlikely to be fully eliminated.  Nonetheless expropriation is 
usually a phenomenon faced by multinational companies, rather than portfolio investors, and 
is becoming less common over time, Minor (1994).  Indeed given the move to more market 
oriented economic systems, albeit in varying degrees and forms, and the concomitant 
commitment to privatisation, among less developed countries, in a number of cases 
expropriated foreign investors have been invited back, in some cases to re-purchase their 
former investments.  In other words not only as expropriation largely ended, in some 
countries it is being reversed.  Therefore the probability of expropriation of real estate 
investment is probably too small to be quantified.  Consequently the expected loss due to 
the prospect of expropriation is unlikely to weigh heavily in the decision-making processes 
of the foreign real estate investor. 
 
In contrast to expropriation, host governments in both developed and developing countries 
have frequently used exchange controls.  Broadly defined, exchange control risk includes 
currency inconvertibility; multiple exchange rates; limits on the ownership of equity and debt; 
and the blockage of fund repatriation.  Again as in the case of expropriation the risk of 
exchange controls is borne primarily by foreign investors, consequently the real estate 
returns in the domestic market would not appropriately reflect such risk.  Also, controls are 
more likely to be triggered by world economic shocks rather than by endogenous factors, 
which means these controls would carry significant impact on even a well-diversified 
international portfolio.  Thus because exchange controls weigh primarily on foreign investors 
and are more prevalent, they are more likely to be a barrier to international investment into 
the less politically safe countries of the world. 
 
Therefore what are the political risks in the emerging markets of the Asian region?  In order 
to answer this question requires rating the exchange control riskiness of each of the country, 
as it is this risk that is most likely to deter foreign investment by real estate investors, Aliber 
(1973) and Haendel et al. (1975).  A number of measures of political risk exist see Erb et al 
(1996).  One particularly useful source in this case is the political risk ratings of Political Risk 
Services (PRS).  This is because one of the risk measures used by PRS is the uncertainty of 
future capital exchange controls, the key political risk facing international portfolio investors’ 
and so the one that needs the most consideration.  Specifically, this category refers to the 
risk from financial transfer, non-convertibility from the local currency to the desired foreign 
currency, and the transfer of foreign currency out of country.  The measure is based on an 
assessment that: (1) restrictions on repatriation of profits or capital, exchange controls, (2) 
payment delays facing exporters to that country, (3) policy related to fiscal and monetary 
expansion and (4) governmental foreign borrowing will be imposed over the next eighteen 
months.  Based on these calculations countries are then rated according to a scale ranging 
from A+ for the least risky to D- for the most risky. PRS provides the following description 
of each letter category: 
 
· A Countries: No exchange controls, repatriation restrictions, or 
other barriers to financial transfer, and little likelihood that 
controls will increase in the forecast period. 
· B. Countries: Modest or sporadic delays in financial transfers; 
a reasonable chance that delays will be high in the forecast 
period. 
· C. Countries: Modest to heavy delays and even blockage of 
financial transfer; a reasonable chance that barriers will increase, 
and little chance that they will decrease within the forecast 
period. 
· D. Countries: Heavy exchange controls and long delays for the 
transfer of currency; little chance that conditions will improve 
within the forecast period. 
 
Table 2 presents the financial transfer risk ratings for various dates from 1982 to 1998 for 
28 selected so called developed and less developed countries.  The table displays a number 
of features of interest.  First, as a whole, the perceived political risk of the sampled countries 
has typically decreased over time.  However, political risk, as perceived by PRS, has 
increased in several countries (for example, India, Italy, and the Philippines).  Second, it 
appears that medium or high political risk is not associated with the developing world.  In 
1991, some developing markets, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Portugal and Taiwan, are 
included in the low or lowest political risk groups (A+ and A) whereas some non-
developing markets, such as Belgium, France, and Ireland are included in the medium 
political risk group (particularly at the beginning of the period).  This evidence lends support 
to Errunza and Losq’s (1987) contention that political risk is not unique to developing 
countries and suggests that it would be a mistake to lump together all developing markets as 
a homogeneous group on the basis of their political risk. 
 
 
Table 2: The Financial Risk Transfer of Selected Developed 
and Less Developed Countries 1982-1998 
 
 
In summary investors frequently shun the politically unstable regions of the world in order to 
avoid political risk.  Solnik (1991) argues that political risks of foreign investment might 
Country 1982 1985 1988 1991 1998 
Australia A A+ A A- A 
Belgium B A- B- A- A+ 
Canada A A A A- A- 
China N/A N/A N/A N/A B 
Denmark A- A A A+ A+ 
France B B A+ A+ A 
Germany A+ A A+ A- A+ 
Greece B- C C B- B- 
Hong Kong N/A A+ A+ A A 
India B B+ B- C B 
Indonesia N/A N/A N/A N/A B 
Ireland B B+ A A- A 
Italy A- B+ B+ B A+ 
Japan A+ A- A+ A A 
Malaysia B+ B A- B+ B+ 
Netherlands A A+ A A A+ 
New Zealand A B+ A- A+ A 
Norway A A A+ A A+ 
Philippines B- C- B- C B 
Portugal N/A N/A N/A N/A A 
Singapore A+ A A A+ A+ 
South Korea B+ C+ A- B+ B+ 
Spain B A- A- A A+ 
Taiwan A B+ A A A 
Thailand B B- B B B 
UK A A A+ A+ A+ 
USA A+ A+ A+ A- A 
Vietnam N/A N/A N/A N/A C 
dampen the enthusiasm for international diversification, as although the risk is extremely 
small, the associated potential loss is large.  On the other hand, Kobrin (1979) suggest that 
political risk assessments are often overstated.  In addition avoidance of political risk also 
leads to the loss of profitable opportunities, JLL (1999) and Lim (2000).  Thus Errunza and 
Losq (1987) contend that investors should not avoid the politically unstable regions of the 
world because investments in these markets might provide returns that outweigh the risks.  
Indeed Cosset and Suret (1996) find that the inclusion of politically risky countries into an 
international investment portfolio leads to an overall reduction in portfolio risk.  While 
Errunza and Losq (1987) and Lessard (1985) suggest that political risk might even favour 
foreign investors relative to domestic investors to the extent that these risks are a domestic 
phenomena that can be diversified internationally.  Finally political risk, in the form of 
exchange controls risk, is not confined to emerging markets. Consequently it is a risk faced 
by any investor going overseas whether they venture into developed or developing markets.  
Therefore political risk need not be a major deterrent to international investment into the 
emerging real estate of the Asian region and its’ impact is probably overstated.  So what 
does deter foreign investment? 
 
Institutional Risk 
 
From surveys of investors it appears that the most important factor deterring overseas 
investment is unfamiliarity with foreign market structures and conventions and other formal 
regulatory barriers.  For example, Worzala (1994) found that 81% of the European 
institutional investors surveyed saw lack of local market expertise as the major problem 
affecting international investing.  A results confirmed by the surveys of the Investment 
Property Forum (reported in Baum, 1995) and Elliot and Halliday, (1996) both of whom 
finds the lack of local expertise and information the greatest difficulty to overseas investment.  
Other factors sighted including different cultural and legal structures and difficulties in 
identifying and managing real estate in foreign markets, all of which are closely allied to this 
perceived lack of local market knowledge.  Thus lack of local market knowledge adds an 
additional risk into the investment decision-making that UK institutional investors would wish 
to avoid.  In other words the greatest barrier to international investment in the real estate 
sector is institutional complexly and the variation in market conduct.  In addition 
considerable differences exist in the characteristics of market participants, i.e. developers, 
investors and real estate service providers across markets.  This has had significant 
implications for the characteristics, quality and comparability of the market information 
generated.  In addition differences in the obligations of occupation and transactions costs 
such as lease lengths, their statutory provisions, real estate transfer taxes, brokers fees and 
non-rent occupancy costs provide another tangible example of differences across and 
between markets.  In particular a diversity of types of real estate investment market exist, 
ranging from very sophisticated markets like the US and UK to underdeveloped markets of 
China and Vietnam.  These differences reflect amongst other things the stage of development 
of other asset markets in the country in question, the structure of investing institutions and 
cultural factors like the prevailing attitude to real estate as an investment.  If investment 
markets are not well developed, then the information base necessary for real estate 
investment decision making in a particular market may be absent.  Consequently Guerts and 
Jaffe (1996) suggest that this “institutional risk” should be a prime area of concern when 
contemplating investing into foreign markets, especially into emerging markets where cultural 
a legal differences will be even more pronounced.  Differences that D'Arcy and Keogh 
(1996) and Guerts and Jaffe (1996) suggest are likely to lead to differing levels of 
performance.  All of which suggests that unless an outsider is fully aware of the institutional 
structures, both formal and informal, between countries and even for segments within a 
country such investors are likely to be at a major disadvantage compared with local market 
players when they wish to enter the market.  Indeed there is some evidence that supports 
the view that local firms perform significantly better than non-domestic investors because of 
their information advantage.  For example, Eichholtz et al (1998b) report that internationally 
diversified property tend to achieve lower returns than domestic property companies without 
the compensation of lower risk.  The authors arguing that these lower returns reflect the 
higher information cost faced by foreign investors leading them to either buy overpriced 
buildings or be unable to identify under priced investments.  Thus if investors can become 
more informed of the institutional structures and business practices of overseas markets they 
are more likely to invest in those markets, i.e. “familiarity breeds investment”, Stratman 
(1999). 
 
Therefore in order to implement an international diversification strategy investors need 
reliable information on the performance of such markets, in order to make rational 
investment decisions, coupled with an understanding of local market trading conditions in 
order to implement those decisions effectively.  Without which investors will avoid such 
markets, as the uncertainty the lack of transparency induces will increase the risk of 
investment to such a level that is becomes unacceptably high.  A key source of barriers 
facing the international real estate investor relates to the acquisition of appropriate 
information about the risk and return characteristics of the markets that they intend to invest 
in. In particular difficulties arise in the standardisation of property returns in particular, and in 
the ability to obtain data on rental values or yields across a wide enough spread of cities to 
have a sample size sufficiently large to be statistically robust.  As international markets 
encompass many different countries with differing administrative, legislative and fiscal 
regimes, coupled with differing property market conventions and codes of valuation practice 
(Keogh and D'Arcy, 1994; Adair et al 1996 D'Arcy and Keogh, 1997a), major issues arise 
regarding the compatibility of property data on a cross-border basis.  In other words before 
international investors venture into the emerging markets of the Asian region the 
transparency of these countries needs to increase to a relatively high enough level before the 
market can hope to attract overseas investors.  Finally when considering investment into new 
markets, especially emerging markets an addition risk, which many investors need to 
consider, is that of corruption.  Indeed Roulac and Eachempti (2000) state that corruption is 
“the single greatest obstacle to economic development” facing countries today.  
Consequently the question becomes how transparent are the real estate markets of the 
Asian region relative to the other countries of the world.  This can be answered by assessing 
their level of market maturity, and the amount and availability of information (transparency) 
and corruption within in each country. 
 
Market Maturity 
 
The consideration of issues relating to the institutional structure of individual real estate 
markets in Asia is important because real estate markets perform differently according to 
their institutional form and structure (D'Arcy and Keogh, 1996).  These real estate market 
institutions mediate pressures for change through a real estate market process that, amongst 
other things, determines values, allocates space in buildings between competing uses, and 
stimulates the production of new space through development and redevelopment.  This 
market process involves mechanisms that bring buyers and sellers together, which generate 
information and signals of market opportunity, which define legal interests in real estate, and 
which regulate trade in real estate.  Market process is not a static concept but rather one 
that is subject to change in response to institutional changes in the real estate market. Such 
changes come from a variety of sources reflecting the diversity of institutional influences - 
social, political, economic, and legal - on the real estate market. However, institutional 
economics suggests that changes in market process will only occur when there are 
opportunities to reduce the transactions costs associated with use and trade in real estate. 
 
For the purposes of the current paper it is important to highlight the extent of the differences 
which exist in the various elements of market process between Asian real estate markets.  
For simplicity the analysis focuses on five features, market actors, obligations of occupation, 
market openness and flexibility, market specialisation, and information generation and 
transmission. These are considered to be the most relevant in the context of European real 
estate portfolio construction. It is also important to highlight the fact that these individual 
elements of market process are not mutually exclusive of each other but are quite 
interdependent.  
 
Starting with market actors, considerable differences between Asian markets exist in the 
characteristics of market participants groups.  These differences span developers, investors 
and real estate service providers alike.  This latter group in particular provides an important 
illustration of the differences that exist between actor groups in different countries. In most 
countries in Asia real estate as a profession is underdeveloped.  As a consequence a 
diversity of individuals reflecting a wide range of professional backgrounds is involved in the 
provision of some form of real estate services and more specifically in the generation of the 
information necessary to make investment decisions.  In turn this has generated a diversity of 
market practices and conventions with little standardisation across countries.  This has had 
significant implications for the characteristics, quality and comparability of the market 
information generated which is a key issue in the context of this paper. 
 
Jones Lang Wootton (1992) in particular sees the process of market maturity as a useful aid 
in “understanding of how markets will emerge, mature and perform in the future”.  In 
particular JLW argue that issue of market maturity has “important implications for the type 
of real estate products that might be appropriately offered to the market, city by city”.  The 
most comprehensive treatment of market maturity is found in Keogh and D'Arcy’ (1994) 
and D'Arcy and Keogh (1998).  The authors identified six factors which may be expected 
to be associated with maturity from the perspective of property market theory, and which 
are generally deemed in practice to be characteristics of maturity by property market 
participants: 
 
Thus it seems reasonable to believe that different markets will follow a common evolutionary 
process from early development through immaturity and finally maturity, albeit at different 
rates (Seek, 1993).  Where Seek visualises a continuum from early development and 
emergence to high levels of maturity, and places specific urban property markets on that 
spectrum.  This approach is interesting for a two reasons.  First, it suggests an ‘S’-shaped 
pattern of development, with the evolutionary process accelerating rapidly and then slowing 
as maturity is approached.  Second, it implies “mature” as the ultimate goal although it might 
be more appropriate to see maturity “as a relative rather than an absolute achievement since 
the future evolution of property market process may render obsolete our current perception 
of maturity” (Keogh and D'Arcy 1994).  Based on these ideas Seek (1996) categorised the 
markets of the Asian region as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Where Seek suggested that in 1993 the main Chinese and Vietnamese cities represent 
markets at their most emergent, with the markets of Taipei and Seoul being characteristic of 
early stages of development.  While the markets of Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Jakarta 
have moved to a stage of rapid development. Hong Kong, Singapore and Auckland 
maturing, with Sydney, Tokyo and Melbourne described as having achieved maturity.  
Consequently if an investor wished to avoid immature markets the choice was essentially 
limited to the capital cities of Japan and Australia, with Auckland, Singapore and Hong 
Kong as a secondary alternative.  Institutional investors meanwhile would avoid the 
emerging markets with the field left to wealthy individuals and high-risk players, Lim (2000). 
 
Figure 1:  Asia Pacific Commercial Property Market Maturity Continuum. 
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As global markets develop, the established investors call for increased transparency to 
reduce the risk of mispricing and to improve the reputation and credibility of the market., 
Gordon (1999).  In other words international investment depends on the ability to achieve 
immediate and full access to market information that can be verified and can be confirmed in 
a shorter time than ever before.  Indeed the free flow of information to all participants is a 
necessary condition for market efficiency.  The newness of emerging markets and the 
different institutional structures adopted, compared with developed countries, suggests that 
access to all relevant information by all investors is unlikely to be the case.  A specific issue 
is transparency, i.e. the ability of market participants to observe the information driving the 
trading process, since such the information available in the trading process dictates the 
investment strategies of investors and so influences market equilibrium and prices, see 
O’Hara (1995).  In addition it can be argued that emerging markets are made up of 
informed as well as uninformed investors both of who operate in a relatively unreliable 
information environment, Antoniou et al (1997).  In particular it could to argued that the 
informed players are locals with a full knowledge of the local market property game, while 
the uniformed players are the international investors.  Thus whereas informed investors 
determine fundamental values from market prices uninformed investors are not equally 
perceptive placing them are at a serious disadvantage in the market.  This implies foreign 
investors who may wish to enter the market will be at a severe disadvantage.  In other 
words foreign investors need to see a high level of transparency within markets as such 
transparency leads to pricing efficiency by which they can feel confident that their investment 
decisions are based on a more thorough information set as to the risks and returns within the 
market.  Thus until the efficiency of a particular market achieves some acceptable level of 
efficiency foreign investors will go elsewhere.  Consequently Gordon (1999) has argued that 
foreign investors will require the market to display the following attributes before then will 
consider investing: 
 
 
The level of transparency within a market therefore depends on the quality and quantity of 
information available.  However, twenty years ago it was virtually impossible to obtain 
performance information about international real estate investments and even now research 
into the performance of property investment markets, especially in Asia, has been limited 
because of serious problems related to data availability and quality.  Difficulties arise in the 
standardisation of property returns in particular, and in the ability to obtain data on rental 
values or yields across a wide enough spread of cities in order to have a sample size large 
enough to be statistically robust.  As Asian markets encompass many different countries with 
differing administrative, legislative and fiscal regimes coupled with differing property market 
conventions and codes of valuation practice (Keogh and D'Arcy, 1994 and D'Arcy and 
Keogh, 1997a), major issues arise regarding the compatibility of property data on a cross-
border basis. 
 
Financial transparency of investment vehicles 
Independent governance of shareholder interest 
Management compensation tied to the performance 
of investment vehicles 
Transparent market risks 
Nonetheless primarily in response to foreign investor demand, the availability, timeliness, and 
quality of property market data is on the rise across the globe.  Especially as a result of the 
globalisation of real estate surveying firms who now provide market data on a much more 
consistent basis for markets across the world.  Indeed branches of several professional 
property practices have now been operating in some of the emerging markets of the Asian 
region for over twenty years.  Initially functioning almost exclusively at a local level in 
conjunction with local firms but in a loose association with an international network, as in the 
case of ONCOR, the more recent mergers taking this global investment advice to new highs 
with an almost world wide coverage being offered to clients in every country across the 
globe.  However, despite the emergence of these global firms with established research 
departments, property market information is still very difficult to obtain in emerging markets 
unless the investor is only interested in a narrow range of property types and locations.  
Otherwise there is virtually no culture of information exchange in the most of the emerging 
markets.  Even where this information barrier is less severe, special knowledge, 
interpretation skills, and local contacts are still necessary for the purpose of actively 
managing a international portfolio. 
 
Gordon (1999) has classified a number of countries on their level of transparency based on 
the following five criteria: 
 
See Gordon (2000) for more information. 
 
Table 3: The Maturity and Transparency of Selected Countries  
 
Presence of public and private performance indices 
Quality of market fundamental research 
Availability of reliable financial statements 
Alignment of interests among directors, 
managers and investors/shareholders 
Taxes, penalties and restrictions on cross-border transactions 
 
The levels of transparency shown in Table 3 are also compared with an assessment of each 
countries market maturity updating the original work of Keogh and D'Arcy’ (1994), Seek 
(1993) and Lee (1999).  As can be readily appreciated the two concepts of market maturity 
and transparency are closely related to one another.  Thus the markets of China, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines are still at the emerging stage of maturity and so also 
display the least transparency.  While the markets of Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan have 
moved to a stage of rapid development towards maturity so can be thought of as emergent 
markets and so still displaying low to levels of transparency.  Thus all these markets are 
unsuitable for institutional investors and are only of interest, at this stage in their 
development, to individuals willing to take a risk or vulture funds seeking out high returns in a 
very short time before moving on to new markets.  In contrast the markets of Hong Kong, 
Singapore and New Zealand, Australia and Japan have much more established markets and 
all show good to high levels of transparency.  All of which suggests that it is these markets 
that are likely to offer the ‘best’ form of investment opportunities to institutional investors 
considering overseas investment in the Asian region.  That is the emerging markets of the 
Asian region (China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia) 
still display levels of transparency and maturity which are likely to deter institutional investors 
from venturing into their domestic real estate markets.  In other words the perception of 
institutional investors, considering investment into the emerging markets of the Asian region, 
is that the “institutional risks” of such markets are such that they are too high, even given the 
Country Maturity Transparency 
Australia Established Highest 
Belgium Nearly Established High 
Canada Established Highest 
China Emerging Low 
Denmark Nearly Established High 
France Nearly Established High 
Germany Established High 
Greece Emerging Opaque 
Hong Kong Nearly Established High 
India Emerging Opaque 
Indonesia Emerging Low 
Ireland Emergent High 
Italy Emerging Low/Opaque 
Japan Nearly Established Semitransparent 
Malaysia Emergent Semitransparent 
Netherlands Emergent High 
New Zealand Emergent High 
Norway Emergent High 
Philippines Emerging Low 
Portugal Emerging Opaque 
Singapore Nearly Established High 
South Korea Emerging Low 
Spain Emergent Low 
Taiwan Emergent Low 
Thailand Emergent Low 
UK Established Highest 
USA Established Highest 
Vietnam Emerging Opaque 
higher expected returns and their portfolio diversification benefits.  Furthermore until their 
transparency and maturity increases this is likely to be the case in the foreseeable future.  
 
Corruption 
 
The unwritten “rules of the game” in each country can be markedly different in terms of how 
business is conducted, compared to an individuals home market.  Consequently the level of 
perceived corruption faced by business within a country could prove a major impediment to 
the successfully implementation of an investment strategy.  This is especially important when 
investment is being considered into less developed countries as it may be thought that such 
countries are also the most corrupt.  Corruption comes in many forms and is constantly 
changing over time, both in terms of the level of corruption (petty or grand), whether 
political, public or private, the frequency of corruption and price paid (low or high), etc.  
Thus a measure is of corruption is needed that is not only on a relative scale but also takes 
account the different forms of corruption and is available over a sufficient length of time to 
see is the level of corruption within a country is increasing or decreasing relative to over 
countries. 
 
The source of perceived corruption data used here is the Corruption Perception Indexes 
(CPI) of Transparency International (TI) for a number of reasons. First, the aim of the CPI 
is to provide data on the perception of corruption within countries as a means of comparing 
the relative levels of corruption between countries.  Second the CPI covers a wide range of 
countries.  Next it incorporates both public and private measures of corruption.  Finally the 
CPI is available over a number of years facilitating an analysis as to whether corruption is 
increasing or decreasing in absolute and relative terms.  To achieve this TI does not rely on a 
single source of data, or polling method but calculates the index based on a “poll of polls”.  
That is the index is drawn from the results from a number of surveys of corruption, each 
based on different sampling frames and methodologies, in order to achieve a more robust 
measure of perceived corruption.  The data drawn from the surveys of a number of 
organisations including: the Economic Intelligence Unit, Gallup International, the Institute for 
Management Development, the Political Risk Services, the World Development Report and 
the World Economic Forum.  Given the diversity of sources and methodologies employed 
the individual sources are firsts standardised before the mean value for each country can be 
determined.  The higher the score the lower the levels of corruption within a country, see 
Lambsdorff (1999) for more details. 
 
Using the data from TI Table 4 shows the CPI for the selected countries used in Tables 2 
and 3.  Table 4 shows that overall the average level of corruption has only slightly decreased 
since the early 1980s, with the average index score of 6.3 in 1998/1999 compared with 6.4 
for the 1980-1985 period, at least for these selected countries.  Nonetheless there is a 
significant difference in the average CPI values for the developed and less developed 
countries in each period, based on ANOVA tests.  In other words the less developed 
countries display significantly worst levels of corruption that developed countries.  However 
there appears to have been an improvement in the perceived level of corruption by business 
people in a number of less developed countries over this period, especially in Thailand, 
Portugal, Indonesia and South Korea.  On the other hand the position a number of countries 
has deteriorated, e.g. China, India and surprisingly Japan and Belgium.  Japan and Belgium, 
two well developed countries, both now displaying a level of perceived corruption on a par 
with Malaysia and Taiwan!  In addition Italy, which may be regarded as a non-developing 
country shows a level of perceived corruption below that of a number of, so called less 
developed countries.  Finally the USA and notably France have both shown a continuing 
downward trend since the early 1980s although both with CPI values still above the 
average.  Consequently all that can be said is that in general the Asian region does suffer 
from a level of corruption which is on average significantly worse than that in the developed 
countries, but that some so called developed countries display levels of business corruption 
more akin to the emerging markets than one would have expected.  Thus corruption is likely 
to a problem in implementing an investment strategy in the emerging markets of the Asian 
region.  But like political risk, corruption could also play a role in the decision to invest in a 
number of mature markets. 
 
 
Table 4: The Corruption Perception Indices for Countries 1980-1999 
 
   Source: Transparency International 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Asian region has become a focus of attention for international investors in recent years.  
Nonetheless many investors have doubts about the prudence of investing in such areas.  In 
particular it may be felt that the expected returns offered in the countries of the Asian region 
are not sufficient good enough to compensate investors for the increased risks of investing in 
such markets.  In other words although interest in the real estate emerging markets of the 
Asian region has increased in recent years, doubts about the expected returns in such 
markets does not compensate institutional investors for the addition risks incurred.  Such 
risks can be classified under four headings: investment risk, currency risk, political risk, and 
market transparency. 
 
In particular is has been shown that the usual risks associated in the literatures that are often 
considered as the main deterrents to overseas investment: currency and political risks are not 
that important to the investment decision.  While the increased investment risk often attached 
to such markets is incorrectly understood, in a portfolio context.  As the inclusion of 
Country 1980-1985 1988-1992 1998 1999 
Australia 8.4 8.2 8.7 8.7 
Belgium 8.3 7.4 5.4 5.3 
Canada 8.4 9.0 9.2 9.2 
China 5.1 4.7 3.5 3.4 
Denmark 8.0 8.9 10.0 10.0 
France 8.4 7.5 6.7 6.6 
Germany 8.1 8.1 7.9 8.0 
Greece 4.2 5.1 4.9 4.9 
Hong Kong 7.4 6.9 7.8 7.7 
India 3.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Indonesia 0.2 0.6 2.0 1.7 
Ireland 8.3 7.7 8.2 7.7 
Italy 4.9 4.3 4.6 4.7 
Japan 7.8 7.3 5.8 6.0 
Malaysia 6.3 5.1 5.3 5.1 
Netherlands 8.4 9.0 9.0 9.0 
New Zealand 8.4 9.3 9.4 9.4 
Norway 8.4 8.7 9.0 8.9 
Philippines 1.0 2.0 3.3 3.6 
Portugal 4.5 5.6 6.5 6.7 
Singapore 8.4 9.2 9.1 9.1 
South Korea 3.9 3.5 4.2 3.8 
Spain 6.8 5.1 6.1 6.6 
Taiwan 6.0 5.1 5.3 5.6 
Thailand 2.4 1.9 3.0 3.2 
UK 8.0 8.3 8.7 8.6 
USA 8.4 7.8 7.5 7.5 
Vietnam N/A N/A 2.5 2.6 
Average 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.3 
emerging markets in an international portfolio is actually beneficial has such markets offer 
increased expected returns and a reduction in portfolio risk.  Thus the main barrier to foreign 
investment in such markets remains that of institutional risk, maturity and transparency.  
Consequently the real estate markets of the Asian region are unlikely to be on the investment 
lists of institutional investors until their maturity and transparency increases to acceptable 
level, something that seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.  In other words countries 
have to recognise that greater transparency and openness is a pre-requisite for success in 
the future, Roulac and Eachempati (2000).  Indeed Gordon (1999) suggests that the 
increase in market transparency in a countries real estate market is the price that must be 
paid for a country to be considered for admission into today’s global investment markets.  
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